Ludwig von Mises coined the term “useful innocents” – later transformed by others into a less charitable term “useful idiots” – to describe those he saw as “confused and misguided sympathizers” of communism. While that ideology isn’t in play over Amendment 2 to Louisiana’s Constitution appearing on the Mar. 29 ballot, the term certainly applies as the political left has found allies on the right to help it do it dirty work in trying to vote down the measure that would fundamentally transform for the better the state’s fiscal system.

The left has pursued a two-prong strategy to this end. One involves an attack over procedural measures surrounding the amendment’s placing on the ballot (as well as with two others). Upon inspection, its attempt is quite weak, and the judiciary is unlikely to find merit in it. However, as a by-product of the suit to invalidate the ballot placement, the ensuing publicity is designed to sow doubt in the minds of those who, upon analysis of its claims, should know better.

The other is a campaign to convince normally sober supporters of religious activity of a fantastical plot to strip ad valorem tax exemptions from the property of religious organizations not exclusively used for religious purposes—merely by moving such exemptions from the Constitution into statute through Amendment 2. The change is part of a strategy to remove from the Constitution provisions that are not necessary as bedrock guiding principles—such as the imperative that religious activity should be supported by the state in prohibiting local governments (and, technically, the state itself, which is constitutionally empowered to levy a statewide property tax of up to 5.75 mills, though it never has) from taxing property unequivocally part of a religious mission. The goal is to shift such provisions into statute to reduce the Constitution’s overly specific and bloated nature.

At present, the Constitution also extends this tax prohibition to ancillary property owned by religious organizations with non-religious uses, as part of a larger exemption for nonprofit organizations, both secular and religious. Placing this exemption into statute, as the amendment’s enabling legislation would do, theoretically makes it slightly easier to adjust exemption statuses in the future, as instead of two-thirds dual chamber legislative votes and a majority popular vote to eliminate only the latter exercise would become necessary. In some cases, this isn’t a bad idea, particularly for nonprofits or categories of them whose contributions to the state may not justify such local taxpayer support.

However, property used for secular purposes is just that—secular property—whether owned by a religious organization or not. That’s why the amendment was written the way it was. Yet, as previously noted, while many states do not afford such exemptions to religious organizations’ ancillary properties, Louisiana does, thanks to a political culture that demands it—demands processed by legislators who depend on elections and, therefore, have great incentive not to cross up constituents on this issue. Suffice to say, there would have to be an enormous sea change in the state’s political culture for enough of the voting public to begin electing legislators who decide they’re going to help local governments squeeze more money onto their coffers by hitting up certain property of religious organizations—and survive electorally after doing so. That is the political reality.

Yet one recent argument from a usually reliably conservative source calls for rejection of Amendment 2 based on the notion that such a shift is realistic not just sometime in the distant future, but now. As alleged proof that legislators will disregard voter concerns, if not the state’s political culture, regarding religious taxation, the piece cites recent legislation that was defeated that would have made it harder for private interests to expropriate property rights for use in carbon capture schemes, expand recourse for compensation for injuries due to vaccines as a condition for employment, and to overturn destructive pandemic policies, as well as supported supplying the state with two majority-minority congressional districts in a map that at best is highly-questionable constitutionally.

While these were unwise policy moves, they are all irrelevant to the issue at hand for several reasons. First, none of these measures required supermajorities to come out on the wrong end, but resulted from failures to attain simple majorities (in the long-running feud over gubernatorial emergency powers – fixed last year by simple majorities–inability to overturn these came as a result of court decisions as well). The constitutional requirement of two-thirds majorities of the seated chamber, which would be required to expand the unprotected property list, would have allowed even one-third plus one of the membership in either chamber to turn back the defeated measure; notably, the disputed congressional map barely secured two-thirds support in each chamber, even though it only needed a simple majority.

Second, none of these examples are tax issues (hence their having no supermajority requirement), much less dealing with property taxes. Keep in mind that if the presumed reason for expanding the kinds of property subject to that tax is to raise more revenue, that legislators, and the governor, in charge of changing this, would see none of that money–as the property tax collections in question go to local governments. It is entirely unserious to suggest that legislators would risk their careers by choosing to die on the hill of broader taxation of religious properties just to shovel more potential revenues to local governments and elected officials.

Second, none of the cited legislative failures pertain to taxation, let alone property taxes. If the goal of expanding taxable property is to raise revenue, legislators and the governor wouldn’t directly benefit, as property tax collections go to local governments. It is entirely unserious to suggest that legislators would risk their careers by advocating for broader taxation of religious properties just to funnel money to local governments.

Because, third, unlike the examples above, protection of religious expression is extremely fundamental in the Louisiana political culture, reflected not just in the Constitution but even more so in statute. While the Constitution tracks the U.S. Constitution in its language on religious expression, statute goes further. In 2010, lawmakers passed the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, which increases the burden of proof on state and local governments to restrict religious expression beyond what the Constitution says. The law increases the burden of proof on state and local government to curtail religious expression beyond that of the Constitution. Only six legislators dared to vote against it.

This underscores the state’s political culture of protecting religious organizations—a stance that remains unchanged 15 years later. It also raises an inconsistency among Amendment 2’s opponents: If they fear that shifting religious property exemptions to statute makes them vulnerable, why are they not similarly concerned that the PRFA itself is “only” in statute? Notably, the largest religious landowner in the state, the Roman Catholic Church, has no objection to the amendment and has approved its wording.

In fact, of those four examples that fall short in asserting that legislators will ignore constituents on religious matters, two could arguably be seen as aligning with Louisiana’s historical political culture and voter wishes. Given the state’s history of tolerating paternalistic government, it could be argued that overturning the unduly restrictive pandemic policies was congruent with that culture, as well as its history of government poking its nose into private transactions means that the failed carbon capture restrictions fulfills the same.

The broader point is this: fears that legislators will suddenly target religious properties if they are moved into statute are overblown and lack an evidence-based foundation. Such concerns resemble the political left’s typical tactic of inciting panic through emotional appeals rather than rational analysis. Louisiana’s political culture and the electorate molded from it simply will not permit a legislative majority to behave in such a way—not now, and likely not in the foreseeable future. While distant-future shifts are always possible, a fundamental cultural transformation would have to occur first.

This highlights yet another flaw in the argument against the amendment: the assumption that keeping these exemptions in the Constitution offers stronger protection than placing them in statute. Because the question of religious expression is so fundamental to the state’s political culture, the resulting tight electoral connection between the governed and the government consequent to that means that any move by legislators to go after the ancillary properties could happen only if a significant shift in attitude by voters on this issue occurred that led to putting lawmakers of that mind into office. In that case, the additional requirement of a majority popular vote for change is no extra safeguard, for if things have come to this, a majority would vote it out.

Finally, what opponents of Amendment 2 fail to acknowledge is that rejecting the amendment would immediately result in a tax increase of at least $200 million annually–at the bare minimum. That’s a big lowball estimate, since all sorts of enabling legislation kicks in if passed, and that adds up to several hundred million more bucks in net tax increases without the amendment. Do the opponents of the amendments really want to fork over significantly more to state government to assuage their unreasonable trepidation?

(It’s possible this could be fixed, by legislation and another try at the ballot box in November, but not without a lot of leakage of tax dollars into state government. Moreover, such a fix is not guaranteed—recall that any fix would require two-thirds votes and suddenly with a lot more money in state government coffers a few of the less fiscally-conservative Republicans who backed Amendment 2 might waver and defeat any such repair.)

In the final analysis, the left’s procedural complaints against Amendment 2 do not hold up, and there is no reasonable basis for claiming that moving certain religious property exemptions from the Constitution to statute puts religious organizations at risk of increased taxation. Nor does keeping them in the Constitution offer any additional protection. Those on the political right must not allow themselves to become useful innocents in the left’s battle to preserve oversized government that punishes society’s most productive members. A rational, evidence-based approach makes it clear: Amendment 2 is a necessary and beneficial reform.