(Andrew Berrier, Real Clear Wire) — In his article “Arctic Eagle Sphere,” published on 17 August by Real Clear Defense, Travis A. Karnes supports President Donald Trump’s contention that Greenland “must be brought more firmly under U.S. control” to secure U.S. Arctic interests.  He then outlines the growing threats posed by Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic and contends, without providing much evidence, that Denmark lacks the capability and will to defend the island from these two powers.  He ends the article with a five-point strategic initiative to secure U.S. interests and deny adversaries sanctuary in the High North.

Karnes is right that a U.S. presence in Greenland is important for U.S. Arctic defense and that Russia, and to a much lesser extent China, has capabilities in the Arctic that potentially threaten the interests of both the U.S. and its NATO allies.  However, he’s wrong that the U.S. needs to “firmly control” Greenland to deter or mitigate the real challenges those two great powers pose. He also ignores the vital role U.S. allies play in meeting both Russian and Chinese security threats in the Arctic and the potential damage that U.S. territorial annexation efforts could inflict on the U.S.’s ability to operate across the region.

Karnes makes several claims about growing Russian and Chinese capabilities in the Arctic that lack a direct tie to Greenland or that lack important context.  For example, he notes that satellite imagery shows that Russia is expanding its bases near the borders of Finland and Norway.  While that is probably accurate, it has nothing to do with Greenland and U.S. acquisition of the island won’t deter it.  These efforts are instead aimed reinforcing Russia’s ground capabilities along the Norwegian and Finnish borders in response to Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO.  The Russians contend that the admission of these two countries into the alliance expands the existing danger to Russia’s Kola Peninsula and Saint Petersburg. Moscow has thus planned a vast expansion of ground force capacity in northwestern Russia, an area that had few ground units before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  To provide context, Finland’s Army Chief recently said Russia plans to base as many as 80,000 soldiers along its border with Finland over the next several years, up from 20,000 before 2022. Many of those new units will likely be based south of the Arctic Circle.   Given Russian losses in Ukraine and the time needed for this expansion, these units will probably have a defensive orientation initially but could eventually pose an offensive threat to the Baltic States and Scandinavia.  It’s highly unlikely they will pose a danger to Greenland.

Karnes also mentions the modernization of Russia’s Northern Fleet, which is based on the Kola Peninsula, particularly its acquisition of Yasen and Yasen-M-class attack submarines that will eventually carry Tsirkon missiles.  The U.S. has acknowledged that these are highly capable submarines that are difficult to track in the open ocean.  They already carry the same naval land-attack cruise missiles Russia has used extensively against Ukraine as well as modern anti-ship cruise missiles.  However, the Northern Fleet probably only has three of these submarines, one of which is currently undergoing long-term maintenance.  Russia’s Navy is building more Yasen-M submarines and surface ships with similar missile capabilities, but funding, manpower, and industrial constraints will almost certainly keep the Russian Navy’s order of battle small by comparison to other great powers.  Thus, while it will have some exquisite capabilities, the Northern Fleet will continue to have limited bandwidth for a wide range of missions.

Karnes also doesn’t specifically say how these submarines threaten Greenland. He does say they are critical to Russia’s ability to conduct land-attack strikes into Europe and to secure Russia’s ballistic missile submarine “bastions” in the Barents Sea.  That is accurate; these submarines are vital to Russia’s likely strategy for war in the Arctic and North Atlantic.  In short, that strategy calls for Russian forces to protect operating areas for Russia’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines in Arctic waters, to deny the U.S. and Allied navies access to the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and to strike critical infrastructure in Europe or the U.S..  While U.S. bases in Greenland could be among those targets, defense of those locations does not require that Denmark cede sovereignty of an island three times the size of Texas to the U.S..  Instead, it requires that, in wartime, the U.S. aggressively seek to eliminate Russian launch platforms before they can strike and to increase the number of interceptors protecting bases in Greenland.

In fact, the implied threat in Karnes’ article, and others that support U.S. annexation of Greenland, is that Russia or China could militarily seize part of the island.  That is a remote possibility at best.  Neither country has the capability to seize and hold territory on the island for a long period.  China, for example, does not have the bases in the region needed to support a forced entry operation or long-term occupation of even a small part of the island.  Russia’s nearest bases in the Arctic and the Baltic are thousands of nautical miles away from Greenland; those lines of communication would pass close to Norway, Denmark, Iceland, or the UK and could easily be interdicted.  Both China and Russia have other security concerns that make seizure of island territory unlikely.  China is focused on Taiwan and is unlikely to divert assault assets from those plans to occupy an island on the other side of the world.  Once the fighting in Ukraine ends, Russia will probably focus on securing any Ukrainian territory it continues to occupy and the growing NATO threat it perceives along its western borders.  Neither is probably willing to risk an Article 5 confrontation with NATO over Greenland alone.

The more likely threats to Greenland come from Russian and Chinese undersea cable attacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, unattributed drone activity, or long-range air and missile strikes in wartime.  All can be addressed under the existing agreements between the U.S. and Denmark for the island’s security and with the cooperation of the people of Greenland itself. In fact, Denmark is already increasing security force presence and surveillance capabilities around Greenland that will improve its ability to respond to many of these challenges, efforts that started before Trump returned to office.  Denmark has plans to purchase more ships designed to protect underwater infrastructure and U.S. built P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.  All these will enhance the defense of Greenland and relieve defensive burdens on U.S. forces.

What Karnes does not address is the potential effect of continued U.S. rhetoric and efforts to annex Greenland, even by force, on U.S. relationships with allies it depends on for Arctic security.  For example, the U.S. cooperates closely with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the UK, and others in challenging Russian submarine operations in the Norwegian Sea, across the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, and in the North Atlantic.  Defense of these areas isn’t “passive” as Karnes implies.  The U.S. and its allies conduct antisubmarine warfare operations and exercises in this region all the time.  The additional assets and information these allies provide reduces the strain on U.S. forces and improves the probability of success.  Would those countries still cooperate extensively with the U.S. after a hostile takeover of Greenland?

What’s equally important is the access that U.S. forces have to NATO member states for these and other Arctic operations.  That access provides a forward defensive posture and other advantages that can’t be replicated from Greenland alone. Access to Iceland, located in the middle of the GIUK Gap, is an obvious example.  Northern Norway provides another.  Bear Island is a small, but strategically important island that Russian Northern Fleet vessels pass in transitioning between the Norwegian and Barents Seas.  It is only about 300 nautical miles from northern Norway’s Andøya Air Station and thus within easy reach of the U.S. P-8 maritime patrol aircraft that have deployed there.  However, Bear Island is over 1000 nautical miles from existing airfields in Greenland.  Even new airfields in Greenland would still be very far from these Russian operating areas.  Using Andøya and other Norwegian bases thus vastly increases the operating time for U.S. P-8s hunting for Russian submarines in the Arctic and reduces the U.S. Navy’s logistical burden.  In 2021, Norway expanded U.S. access to multiple areas of its territory, adding more value to this relationship.  Would Norway reconsider U.S. military access to its territory after a hostile U.S. takeover of Greenland?  Some Norwegian commentators might argue that such access potentially puts Norwegian sovereignty at risk as well.

Canada is similarly important.  The U.S. and Canadian forces are deeply integrated in the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. relies on 49 ground radars in northern Canada to help warn of an attack coming over the North Pole.  Would Canada rethink this level of access if the U.S. pressured Denmark into ceding sovereignty of Greenland to Washington?  How would rhetoric about making Canada the 51^st U.S. state influence those considerations? Can the U.S. replicate the surveillance capabilities it currently has across northern Canada only from Greenland and Alaska? Probably not.

The U.S. has long cooperated with these NATO allies for security of its Arctic interests and should continue to do so.  This alliance provides strategic and operational advantages through the sharing of intelligence, provision of military forces, and territorial access that would be hard for the U.S. to achieve on its own.  The U.S. shouldn’t risk throwing those rewards away because of dubious strategic analysis and imperial pretensions.  Greenland, although important to U.S. security, certainly doesn’t provide all these advantages and would add economic, military, and political burdens should it become a U.S. territory.  The U.S. should instead skip the hyperbole and find ways to continue to improve interaction with its NATO allies in the Arctic to better counter growing threats across this vast region.

Andrew (Andy) Berrier is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with extensive experience in U.S. diplomatic posts in the former Soviet Union.  After his military career, Mr. Berrier served as a military analyst in the U.S. intelligence community. 

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.